-Aspen's historic May 5, 2009 IRV election audited as single ballots- 5/5/09 Aspen CO held an instant runoff election (IRV) for mayor and 2 council members. Interpreted contents of each ballot, scanned by True Ballot, were publicly released. Open records requests for a CD of image scans were denied. Aspen has been sued to protect records from destruction and to allow inspection of the scanned ballot files. A Court of Appeals ruling holds that unidentifiable ballots are public records.

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Showing posts with label election. Show all posts
Showing posts with label election. Show all posts

Saturday, November 19, 2011

Can we keep a secret? Column by Jack Johnson annotated by Harvie Branscomb and Marilyn Marks

Heading 1There are many misunderstandings projected by Jack Johnson’s column below.  Citizens are accustomed to being lied to or misled in the newspaper, but in this case, the misunderstandings are stacked upon a context of consistent misinformation put forth from a variety of sources that ought to be dependable and credible, but may not be. What is so aggravating about this column is that it comes at a time when people like me are trying to dissect the facts out of the usual mudslinging to propose legislation to implement what Colorado's constitution actually calls for – anonymous ballots.  I hope our legislators are reading Jack’s column not just with a grain of salt, but with a whole box of it.  
Black text is published text by Jack Johnson (former Pitkin County Commissioner, candidate for Aspen City Council, May 2009, as printed in a column in the Aspen Daily News). I have applied strikeout on the defective portions that I would not have included in the column, if I were writing it. (Harvie Branscomb)
Red text in brackets [] is by Marilyn Marks ( candidate for Mayor, May 2009)
Blue text in brackets [] is by Harvie Branscomb (Colorado Voter Group, Coloradans For Voting Integrity)
Can we keep a secret?
Aspen Daily News Staff Report - (wrong- this is actually a regular bi-weekly column by Jack Johnson)
Friday, November 18, 2011
Election law is complex. It is also important. Marks v. Koch seeks to overturn a century’s worth of election law and should be reviewed by the Colorado Supreme Court.
[The election law has not been overturned in any way. The Open Records Law, which has been in place for over 40 years and which allows ballots to be public records, has merely been upheld. It is modeled after the same open records law that permitted the Bush/Gore ballots or the Coleman/Franken ballots to be reviewed by the press and public to reach their own conclusions.]     No elected or appointed official in Aspen invented Colorado election law or the secret ballot. They are only charged — for our benefit and upon our behalf — with interpreting and implementing it. Average citizens, the press and even loud-mouthed local public policy columnists all very much take the secret ballot for granted. We have forgotten, if we ever knew, how hard it was to win the right to such because much of the intellectual thought regarding election law and the right to a secret ballot was settled in the 19th century.
[Actually “secret” ballots were allowed until 1947, and Colorado ballots were traceable if an official peeked at the concealed ballot number on the voted ballot. Before 1947, three election officials with separate keys had to collaborate to open the ballot box. They could then remove ballots stuffed by ineligible voters or fraudulent officials by checking the identities of the ballots using the printed numbers. That’s not what we now (misleadingly) call the “secret ballot,” but there was a requirement to keep ballots as secret as possible using a glass ballot box and three keys. “Secrets” to be shared with and by election officials are subject to abuse. So, in 1947, the constitution was changed to guarantee that ballots are anonymous and the officials could obtain no “secrets” about how we vote. Believe it or not, that is what we now call the “secret ballot” or “Australian ballot.The only “secret” is your privacy in the act of voting the anonymous ballot. The contents of ballots are no longer “secret” as that was a dangerous proposition. You can perhaps begin to understand how poor a term the phrase “secret ballot” is. It is utterly and essentially confusing. And that confusion is particularly rampant in Aspen. That’s a confusion that is not at all remedied by Jack’s confused opinion. ]

Friday, November 18, 2011

Lots of press coverage of the transparency issue in Colorado


By Katharhynn Heidelberg
[copy of full version shown below]

As a dispute over whether images of ballots are subject to public records law heads to the state Supreme Court, the county clerks in Montrose and other counties are doing all they can to keep citizens' votes private. 

They do not accept a recent Court of Appeals ruling that requires Aspen's city clerk to release digital copies of ballots cast in a 2009 mayoral race there. 

The race's unsuccessful candidate, Marilyn Marks, challenged under the Colorado Open Records Act the Aspen city clerk's decision not to provide her with the copies. Aspen, which had cited municipal election code and the potential for "substantial injury to the public interest," won at the district court level. An appeals court agreed with Marks, however: constitutional voter-secrecy requirements only protect a voter's identity, not the content of the ballot.

Monday, November 14, 2011

Colorado election officials predict legislative effort to block ballot transparency

Grand Junction Sentinel (11/14/2011) 

Voters' secret ballots may not be so secret after ruling  

[annotations in brackets and in red by Harvie Branscomb 11/14/2011] 
[ Ballots are not the property of individual voters.  Ballots containing any secrets at all are unconstitutional if the marks (printed or hand marked) on them are identifiable to an individual. Colorado law does not call for "secret ballots"... it calls for anonymous untraceable ballots.  Unfortunately this clerk and others are taking the position that they alone and their employees have the right to access and even hide such secrets. What they are saying is that they have not taken and are not taking the steps necessary to make the ballots anonymous. This is extremely troubling. ]

REINER Sheila
Sheila Reiner


The state’s county clerks plan to ask the Colorado Legislature when it reconvenes in January to make ballots exempt from the Colorado Open Records Act.
[ The clerks attempted the same thing in 2007 and were quickly rebuffed by the Colorado Senate who removed that portion of an election "cleanup" bill before passage. The Colorado Press Association and citizens lobbied successfully to keep the status quo - so voted ballots remained accessible to the public under Colorado Open Records Law, with appropriate safeguards for maintenance of physical ballot integrity.]

The clerks say a Colorado Court of Appeals ruling in August that ballots are public records has turned election law on its head and could allow someone to find out how people voted, no matter how careful clerks are in guarding voter secrecy.  [ The Court of Appeals did not change any law - it merely clarified the appropriate interpretation, namely that ballots are public records and only those that are traceable to a voter must be withheld from the public. ]

But fixing the problem could be more problematic than most people think, Mesa County Clerk Sheila Reiner said.  Reiner and Jefferson County Clerk Pam Anderson, who are facing identical lawsuits demanding to make their ballots public, say doing so would identify individual voters and how they voted. As a result, they think ballots should be made exempt from open-records laws. [ If Reiner and Anderson are holding ballots that are provably traceable, they have conducted an unconstitutional election. If they are holding back these ballots, they may be interfering with our rights to know the weaknesses of our own elections.  Their procedures, and perhaps some less fortunate aspects of Colorado's law should be changed to make all elections compatible with the constitution. ]

“Secretary of State (Scott) Gessler is working on rules to accommodate this process, but we don’t believe the rules should be created because we don’t think the ballots should be made public record,” Reiner said. “What we’re asking the legislators for is a CORA exemption. This is a problem.”

Some people disagree, saying a balance can be struck that maintains election transparency without violating secrecy laws. [There is no "secrecy law" for ballots in Colorado. There is a requirement for "secrecy in voting to be maintained if voting devices are used. The constitutional provision for privacy of the vote is clear - make the ballots anonymous and then all of them are harmless public records that can provide the benefit of direct citizen oversight. Oversight by citizens and campaigns will help establish election credibility based on facts instead of the current public relations statements by clerks that typically rely upon a lack of complaints to demonstrate quality. Citizen verification becomes only more important when our election procedures have been almost entirely mechanized (electronic voting systems and electronic pollbooks) and heavily centralized ( extensive use, sometimes required, of mail-in ballots, the resulting heavy use of central counting, and also new voting methods employing early voting, vote centers and aggregated precincts). ]

Thursday, November 10, 2011

Secret meetings about public documents?

Two separate public bodies in Aspen held secret sessions to discuss my open records request- whew! The irony overwhelms me.
Last night the Aspen Election Commission met to discuss my records request to inspect Aspen’s 2011 ballots, that were voted in a conventional election (not IRV) under procedures that were extensively discussed and enacted prior to the election, and conducted by an experienced election manager from Pitkin County, who is also a lawyer and who understands well the importance of anonymity. I have reason to believe that these ballots are in fact anonymous for all practical purposes and would like to demonstrate the fact to counteract widespread myths that Aspen ballots might be traceable. I issued an open records request to inspect Aspen’s 2011 ballots, that are slated for immediate destruction according to the antiquated state law concerning municipal elections.

Sunday, May 23, 2010

Harvie Branscomb's Letter to Aspen Daily News--Open Access to Ballots

The national trend toward open access

Editor:

“Voted ballots, which are not traceable to the individual voter, are public records subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act,” wrote the Attorney General of Michigan in a May 13, 2010, opinion. His decision shines a new and positive light on Marilyn Marks’ request to a local court for access to digital images of Aspen’s May 2009 ballots.

Michigan voter rights advocates, like Marilyn, sought access to voted ballots from recent elections for auditing purposes. Their Attorney General’s ruling reinforces a fundamental principle that ballots are public records because they are anonymous and must not be traceable to an individual. Michigan’s constitution says only “preserve the secrecy of the ballot.” Colorado’s constitution requires “secrecy in voting,” meaning privacy, and says “no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it,” meaning anonymous. Colorado’s requirement of ballot anonymity is very specific.


Thursday, May 20, 2010

Election Activist Mike LaBonte Comments on Michigan's Public Access to Ballots

 Laws regarding freedom of access to voted ballots are often fuzzy at best, and seem downright restrictive at worst. Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox has written a very enlightened opinion responding to a question from Michigan Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land. Cox concludes:

"Voted ballots evidence the electors' preferences, and ultimately support the election or defeat of candidates and the approval or disapproval of ballot proposals in an election. They are the primary source for election results. Therefore, voted ballots are "writings" that record meaningful content and constitute "public records" for purposes of the FOIA."

He then goes on to address common misunderstandings of "secret ballot":

"Importantly, the question you pose does not raise "secrecy of the ballot" concerns because, as described above, a ballot is no longer traceable to the elector who voted it once the stub with its unique serial number is removed and the ballot is placed in the tabulator. Once placed in the tabulator, the voter's ballot and the selections recorded upon it become anonymous."

The opinion is thorough, well written, and a great read for those who wish to better understand the issues of election transparency, even for those outside of Michigan.

http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/150/MI_AG_7247-80970.pdf

http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/150/MI_AG_7247att-80971.pdf


This is yet another victory in the fight for election transparency. One state at a time people are realizing that the genius of the Australian ballot system lies in it's ability to simultaneously provide private voting and ballot transparency.

Sunday, April 18, 2010

Discussion of ballot text for possible future Aspen voting methods for November ballot question: Aspen Election

A discussion and questions about the presentation of voting methods for future Aspen elections on the ballot for the November coordinated election.

From: Harvie Branscomb [mailto:harvie@media.mit.edu]
Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 1:36 AM
To: 'Mick Ireland', Aspen City Council, Aspen Election Commission
Subject: deciding the method of voting


Several voting systems will be identified to be placed on the ballot.  One of them will be similar or same as the IRV used in 2009.
Another one is likely to be plurality/winner takes all, no majority required
Another one is likely to be vote for one, majority required, runoff if necessary (or vote for 2 if CC)
Another one could be e.g. approval voting (each candidate can receive one vote per voter, voter votes for as many as preferred, majority required, runoff likelihood reduced
Another could be e.g. district or party primary, followed by general election, etc.

Will the IRV choice be represented by exactly what was done in 2009 or by an improved description? This seems to be a key question. I now think that calling rank choice voting “IRV” is a mistake.  I now see it as “RRV” or reduced runoff voting- a system that makes runoffs much less likely but would call for a runoff in case a true majority of ballots was not achieved by the winner(s) of the rank choice vote.

Thursday, April 15, 2010

TrueBallot certifies Aspen May 5, 2009 election "fair and accurate" on April 12, 2010

The following was produced as a response to a Colorado Open Records request for the certification called for in the agreement between TrueBallot, Inc. and the City of Aspen.   The contract, signed by the City Clerk on April 23, 2009  states that "upon completion of the tabulation of the ballot, TBI and/or John Seibel, Esq. shall, if no substantial irregularity has occurred, certify the ballot as fair and accurate."  The original contract in pdf form can be found by clicking here.  The open records request was sent on April 8 2010 and the following letter was written on April 12, 2010.

TrueBallot, Inc
Election Services & Solutions
3 Bethesda Metro Center
Suite 700
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
(301) 656-9500
FAX (301) 656-3558
http://www.trueballot.com

John L. Seibel
President
john@trueballot.com

April 12, 2010

Kathryn Koch
City Hall
130 S. Galena St.
Aspen, CO 81611

Dear Ms. Koch:

I believed that we provided a certification of the May, 2009 Aspen City election at the time of the election when all of the election data was presented.  However, in the event that certification was not provided, please accept as this letter as certification that the tabulation of the ballots in May, 2009 Aspen city election as presented on May 5, 2009 and subsequently amended to correct an insubstantial error in the final tabulation of the results in the Mayor's race, were fair and accurate.

Sincerely,
TrueBallot, Inc

John L. Seibel, President

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Commentary on Dismissal of Marks v. Koch - Aspen Election Transparency

Here is an original opinion piece written by Harvie Branscomb on March 10, 2010. A linked html version of the Court ruling is found here: http://aspenelectionreview.blogspot.com/2010/03/judge-dismisses-marks-v-koch-case-aspen.html

On Wednesday District Court Judge Boyd decided, months into the process of litigation, to dismiss a case brought against the Aspen City Clerk to obtain public access to anonymous digital ballot images from a May 5 first-time in Colorado Instant Runoff Voting municipal election. The dismissal comes two days before an important deposition of the election contractor would have explained the election process on public record and a mere two weeks before the planned trial date.
(continued below the break:)

Judge Dismisses Marks v. Koch case - Aspen Transparency Suit

The following is the order made March 10 2010 by the District Court dismissing the Marks v. Koch case and making the planned deposition of TrueBallot Inc on March 12 moot as well as vacating the hearing set for March 22 and 23 for which extensive plans for arguing the merits of the case had been made.

Link to the rest of the coverage of this case is here: 

The link to the original document (transferred by OCR into search and screen-friendly text below the break): Order on Pending Mot.pdf

Saturday, February 27, 2010

Defendants reply to Surreply regarding Protective Order - Marks v. Koch (Aspen Election Transparency Suit)

Below the break is the memorandum by the Aspen City Attorney responding to the Plaintiff's surreply regarding the City's request for a protective order to prevent or to limit the deposition of election tabulation contractor TrueBallot Inc. by Marilyn Marks.  This is the fifth document in the series discussing the access to TrueBallot's testimony.  The City again fails to acknowledge that Plaintiff (and the public) has a reason to inspect the ballot images- namely to be able to understand and be able to correct for errors and irregularities in the election system to protect the quality of the election process for the future. The City acknowledges only two possible such motivations- contesting the election or determining how individual voters voted.  The city has not only mis-characterized Marilyn Marks' motives,  but in addition, the motivation for requesting public information by CORA is not relevant according to law.

Above is opinion by Harvie Branscomb.
Previous coverage of the case is found here: http://aspenelectionreview.blogspot.com/2010/02/plaintiffs-surreply-regarding.html

Thursday, February 25, 2010

Plaintiff's Surreply regarding Defendant's Motion to protect TrueBallot from deposition - Marks v. Koch (Aspen Election Transparency Suit)

On Feb. 23, 2010, the attorney for Marilyn Marks filed a 3 page memorandum further pursuing opposition to the City of Aspen request for a protective order to prevent deposition of TrueBallot, Inc. by Marilyn Marks. This memorandum, shown here below the break, refers to additional case law which is pertinent to what argument is to be used in the balancing test which would form the basis for denying the Plaintiff the right to obtain testimony by deposition.

Above is opinion by Harvie Branscomb.
Click here for the original pdf of the SurreplyToMotionForProtectiveOrder.pdf
Previous coverage of the Marks v. Koch transparency case is located here: http://aspenelectionreview.blogspot.com/2010/02/reply-in-support-of-defendants-motion.html

Monday, February 8, 2010

Questions Mailed to Aspen Special Counsel Jim True, February 8 2010

Attorney Jim True
Special Counsel, City of Aspen, Colorado
February 8. 2010

Special Counsel True:

My initial research over the past 8 months into the Aspen May 5 2009 election has unexpectedly led to the rise of more questions than have been answered. Even so, over a hundred articles, op-eds and letters in the press have been generated already.  I believe this discussion has only just begun. 

I am archiving (http://aspenelectionreview.blogspot.com) the discussion about this election for other jurisdictions and future historians as is well justified by the unique and historic nature of this election: first IRV in Colorado, possibly the first single ballot audit public election in the USA, one of the first elections with publicly accessible ballot interpretations, one of the first in which ballot images were shown in public while they were being interpreted by a combination of machine and by hand, and the first public election in which a CD of pre-existing ballot images was withheld from an open records request. 

In addition there turn out to be numerous other variances from ordinary or expected procedure, not the least of which was the post election activation of the Election Commission by public request and the strange treatment of it thereafter.  I hope that election activists and election officials around the nation can learn from the experience in Aspen which my research has uncovered.  My hope is to leave a clear track record in favor of public involvement and oversight in a people’s election, and not a conclusion that the public can be adequately served by election officials acting in substitution for or adverse to citizen involvement.

As you know from a previous letter to editor, I have questions for the City of Aspen.  Here is an edited and improved version of the questions.  The answers to these questions I will post on the above web site when they are received.  Thanks very much for your participation in explaining how the Aspen election system works and what happened in Aspen in regards to this past municipal election of May 5, 2009.

1. What might a citizen risk by asking questions? From my perspective, two volunteer commissioners were recently relieved of their role following an unjust smear campaign that prevented their pursuit of election quality improvements. It appears to me that their principal error was to ask difficult questions.

Adjunct questions:
1b. What was their error or errors?
1c. Were the commissioners dismissed? 
1d. When did their tenure end and  
1e. why? 
1f. Will new commissioners engaged in a manner consistent with City Charter? 
1g. Could they also be subject to some kind of a retroactive termination of their duties?


2. Please describe the decision-making process through which Chris Bryan and Elizabeth Milias came to be non members of the Election Commission (CC discussion, vote, etc.).   
2b. Was due process followed and
2c. were they treated correctly and informed of their role,
2d. of their tenure and
2e. of their responsibilities?  
2f. Were any commissioners told that their role is “ceremonial”? 
2g. Is their role ceremonial?

3. Were there procedural defects reported for the May 5 election, such as less-than-private early voting, keys left in ballot box, insufficient testing, last minute changes to software setup, non-random and incomplete auditing, failure to audit the tabulation in time, etc.?  
3b. Will there be a public airing and discussion of these and other problems? 
3c. What steps will be taken to prevent future errors in following election procedures? 
3d. Is there any benefit to be obtained when citizens point out election problems quietly and responsibly as opposed to loudly and publicly?

4. Does the city believe that the ballots and digital images cannot legally be removed from the locked ballot box for inspection?
4b. If so, wasn't it illegal to open the box on May 7 for a part of an audit?

5. Does Ordinance Sec. 2.26.050 require:  “At a minimum, the City Clerk shall arrange the counting of ballots so that the candidates and their representatives may observe the ballots as they are counted?”  
5b. If so, why are voted ballots not subsequently allowed to be seen by the public, except for a part of an audit?

6. What powers do you believe the Colorado law says the Election Commission has under the City Charter and state law? Colorado law appears to give power to the Election Commission for purposes of checks and balances.
6b. In your view, who or what entity provides election oversight or checks and balancesfor Aspen elections?

7. Should City Council members select two election commissioners while essentially employing the third, knowing their own re-election might depend on an Election Commission decision?

8. Are citizen members of the Election Commission expected to avoid representing their party's interests?
8b. Are candidates expected to refrain from advocating to commissioners?

9. If future election commissioners learn that election officials have made a mistake do they have any ability to overrule the officials?
9b. Could they become subject to some kind of retroactive termination of their tenure for questioning the city attorney's advice?
9c. What protects them from a future smear campaign which renders them impotent if they disagree with City Council?

10.  If it is recognized that irregularities occurred, and since the Election Commission asked, why wasn't the Election Commission allowed to be advised by outside counsel?

11. Does the city inform its citizen volunteers regarding the rules regarding open records and open meetings?
11b. Were Kathryn Koch's meetings with Elizabeth Milias or with Chris Bryan (but not together) more acceptable than the few meetings Milias and Bryan had without Koch?

12. Are the recently applied standards for Election Commission meetings and records applied to the Housing Frontiers Board and the Financial Advisory Board?
12b. Do these groups announce meetings or take minutes?

13. When were the two election commissioners dismissed, or did their term simply end in July? 13b. As a commission member by law, is Kathryn Koch as a lone member of the Election Commission now a quorum by herself and therefore perpetually in a public meeting subject to CORA?

 14. Is it possible for someone to overturn the election after the deadline for contests is over?

15. Why was the software configuration changed (presumably to the Cambridge method) the evening before the polls opened without notifying the press, candidates or public? 
15b. Why do the currently posted results of the election on the City website show indications of use of the Cambridge method and an incorrect threshold for all three contests. 
15c. Why does the posted election report show all three winners won with 1273 votes? 
15d. Why are most of the election records previously publicly available no longer on the city web site?
16. After the tabulation error was found by True Ballot, why wasn’t the public notified for 10 days (past the recount deadline)?

17. Was a post election public audit to verify the IRV tabulation (not just the interpretation of individual ballots) performed?
17b. Wasn’t a full hand count to verify the IRV process anticipated on several occasions by council members prior to the election?
17c. Could a full hand count of the election have been performed to check the unique TrueBallot machine-based tabulation and resultant outcome?

18. The City stated in a formal press release that there was a “staff audit of the IRV process.”  What  “staff audit” of the IRV process took place?
18b. What did it consist of?  
18c. Which contests were audited and
18d. to what extent (i.e. what parts of the IRV process were not audited)?

19. Has any City representative stated that someone could use the ballot images to match the ballot contents with the poll book list to identify how voters voted?
19b. Is this not a problem with similarly sequenced ballot data strings?

20. The Charter calls for a majority of votes cast to win a council seat.  Does the language in the Charter actually mean that a majority of voters voting need not have voted for the winner to satisfy the law?

21.  Was the public told that a lower ranking on IRV cannot hurt a first ranked candidate’s chances of winning? 
21b. Is the unique Aspen method for the City Council contest contrary to a provision of state law?

22. Were the Diebold machines used to officially count the Art Museum vote? 
22b. If not, where is the result from the TrueBallot process posted?
22c. Were we told that the Diebold machines were not used for official counts?

23. Why was the early voting ballot box in City Hall not always locked?

24. Does the law allow early voting for city elections? 
24b. Why were the absentee voting procedures not followed for 803 “early voters?”

25. Q. With respect to the IRV ballots, what definitions does the city use for each of the following terms:

Secret
Anonymous
Secure
Issued
Cast
Undervote
Overvote
Spoiled

26. Q. With respect to the definitions, above, where in the law is each definition specified?

27. How many ballots were accepted by the AccuVote machines but rejected for any IRV round due to improper marking?

28. Why do Aspen rules require #1 and or #2 choices to be ranked to be eligible for IRV counting, when common IRV practice is to ignore gaps. For example, if only #3 and #5 are ranked these are usually regarded as #1 and #2 choices.

29. Is there a legal challenge process for the voters who did not find their string in the published list of ballot strings?

30. [not applicable to be answered by the City]

31. Are any materials from the L&A tests (both AV-OS and IRV) available to the public?
31b. Were any incorrectly or poorly marked ballots tested?

32. Since the software counting method had to be adjusted during the course of election eve, isn't it fair to say that the system used was not fully tested?

 33. Was the True Ballot tabulation system required to be certified by law?
33b.  Was it?

34: Question: If you can get an image of everyone's ballot, will you be able to see who the voter was? 
34b. I know that when I vote there seems to be a number tied to that ballot and they ask for an ID when I show up.  Also, in the last mail only election I had to put my name on the envelope the ballot came in.  What's to prevent the person who gets the ballots from looking at each ballot and who sent that ballot in?

35: Question:  The Colorado Bar Association says it doesn't address the condition that the Election Commission (EC) and the City are directly adverse to one another. Why wasn't this possibility considered in the query to the Ethics Committee?

36:  Question: The Ethics Committee replied that it doesn't know if the EC is a client of the City Attorney. Is the EC a client of the City Attorney? 
36b. If the City Attorney has no answer for this, how would one find out the answer to this question?

37: Question: If the EC is a client of the City Attorney is that representation subject to the consent of the Election Commission, as the CBA indicates?

38: Question: If the EC refuses the representation of the City Attorney, does it have a right to counsel, and should that counsel be paid for by the City?  If not, why not?

39: Question: If the EC is not a client of the City Attorney does it have a right to counsel? 
39b. Is it expected to pay independently for that counsel?

40: Question: Why would the City want to file a motion for a protective order to prevent Marilyn Marks from obtaining testimony from True Ballot Inc. by deposition? 
40b. What public interest could be served by blocking this disclosure from the company which tabulated the election?

41: Question: Why is the City Attorney complaining to Judge Boyd about the cost of defending the litigation against the City Clerk for inspection of ballot images?
41b. Has the City taken steps which have caused an increase in the cost of litigation such as filing extensive briefs and a motion for a protective order?  
41c. Isn’t the cost  of litigation is a direct cost to Marilyn Marks but instead an indirect cost to the City because it is covered by salary and overhead?

42:  Question: Why can't the city provide copies of the spoiled ballots which are classified as "other election records"? 

43: Question: Why can't the city provide information about the seals which protect the election records?

44: Has Jack Johnson paid for his CORA request?
44b. Should the city pay for such a request?

45: How do “public records” become accessible to the public?
45b. Can private agendas be served by a selective process through which “public records” become public?


Sincerely,
signed by Harvie Branscomb

Harvie Branscomb
PO  Box 2720
Basalt CO, 81621
970-963-1369

cc: City Council, Election Commission & assorted others by electronic means

Friday, February 5, 2010

new: KDNK News: Media coverage of Aspen election & Marks v. Koch transparency suit

 KDNK News: Hearing date set for Aspen's '09 election

The City of Aspen's May 2009 election has spiraled into a lawsuit that looks like it could finally make its way to court. Former Aspen Mayoral candidate Marilyn Marks wants access to ballot images to verify the method for counting votes. But so far the city has refused saying it would violate state law. On Thursday a judge scheduled a hearing for late March. KDNK's Conrad Wilson reports.

Download mp3 file

---- older media reports follow below the break----

Friday, January 29, 2010

Report prepared for Aspen by Scott Adler on Release of Cast Election Ballots for Public Inspection

The following is a Disclosure of Testimony by the City of Aspen for Marks v. Koch for expert witness E. Scott Adler.  This document was partially converted for the web by H. Branscomb and annotated with yellow background on some key phrases.  The original and complete pdf is located here: Disclosure of Testimony. Please report any transcription errors to H. Branscomb as a comment to this blog.

Assessing the Impact of the Release of Cast Election Ballots for Public Inspection

Report prepared for the matter of Marks v. Koch, 09 CV 294

E. Scott Adler
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Colorado, Boulder

January 21, 2010

REPORT OF SUMMARY OF EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY

      It is my contention that the release of election ballots or ballot images for public inspection would cause substantial injury to the public interest.  I base this position on my knowledge of research on the history of American elections and studies of contemporary voter behavior, election administration and public opinion.